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Abstract
Recent literature on monetary policy analysis extensively uses the sticky price
model of price adjustment in a New Keynesian Macroeconomic framework. This price
setting model, however, has been criticized for producing implausible results regarding
inflation and output dynamics. This paper examines and compares dynamic responses
of the sticky price and sticky information models to a cost-push shock in a New
Keynesian DSGE framework. It finds that the sticky information model produces
more reasonable dynamics through lagged, gradual and hump-shaped responses to a
shock as observed in data. However, these responses depend on the persistence of the
shock.
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1. Introduction
Much research has recently explored monetary policy analysis in which dynamic general
equilibrium techniques of real business cycle analysis were adapted, and some nominal price
rigidities were included to obtain a framework suitable for monetary policy analysis.1 In
such a framework, which is called the New Keynesian, agents are assumed to solve dynamic
optimization problems in monopolistically competitive markets with some nominal price
or wage stickiness. Many such recent studies led to the sticky price Phillips curve, which
is mostly based on Calvo’s (1983) model.2
In a typical New Keynesian macroeconomic model, the demand side is represented by
an IS equation and the supply side by the sticky price Phillips curve. These behavioral
equations are obtained explicitly from the optimization of households and firms. The
framework is generally closed by assuming a monetary policy rule. This rule is usually
in the form of an interest rate rule proposed by Taylor (1993), which is a feedback rule
and determines the interest rates according to the deviations of output and inflation from
their target levels. The sticky price Phillips curve in such a framework has been criticized
for producing unrealistic output and inflation dynamics.
As an alternative to the sticky price Phillips curve, Mankiw and Reis (2002) proposed
the “sticky information Phillips curve.” The main premise of their model is that informa-
tion about macroeconomic conditions spreads slowly throughout the population; although
prices are set every period, information collecting and processing take time. In this model,
a fraction of firms get complete information about the economy in each period randomly
and independent of waiting time and set their prices according to this new information,
while the remaining firms set their prices according to old information. Using a simple
quantity equation instead of an IS curve, and an exogenous stochastic process for money
supply instead of an interest rate rule, they showed the maximum impact of a monetary
1Some early examples of such studies include Benassy (1995), Cooley and Hansen (1995), King and Wat-
son (1996), Rotemberg and Woodford (1995, 1997), Yun (1996), Goodfriend and King (1997), McCallum
and Nelson (1999a, 1999b, 2000), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), Woodford (1999).
2Rotemberg (1987) obtained the standard Calvo-type sticky price Phillips curve formulation by assum-
ing quadratic costs of changing prices.
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shock on inflation occurs after a substantial delay and the responses are hump-shaped in
their model.
In this paper, dynamic responses of the sticky information Phillips curve and a standard
sticky price Phillips curve to a unit cost-push shock3 are investigated and compared in a
New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, which includes an
IS equation and a Taylor-type policy rule for monetary authority. In recent literature there
are a few studies which compare the sticky price and sticky information models. Such as
Trabandt (2006) compares these two models under monetary and technology shocks and
finds out that they both performs well in delivering the facts observed in data. Keen (2006)
makes a similar study and obtains that two models behave similarly and inflation peaks
immediately after a monetary shock when the nominal interest rate is used as the policy
instrument. However, the sticky information model produces more plausible dynamics
when the policy instrument is money growthin his study.
The first contribution of this paper to the literature is to integrate the sticky information
Phillips curve into a DSGE model, where aggregate demand curve is represented by an
IS equation and a Taylor-type interest-rate feedback policy rule is assumed for monetary
authority rather than a simple quantity equation and exogenous money supply process
as in Mankiw and Reis (2002). Second contribution is to investigate and compare the
dynamic responses for a cost-push shock unlike the monetary or productivity shocks as in
Mankiw and Reis (2002), Trabandt (2006) and Keen (2006). Therefore, this paper tries
to find out whether the results of Mankiw and Reis are robust to different assumptions
about aggregate demand, shocks and the nature of monetary policy.
In literature, there are many versions of the sticky price model that are obtained by
modifying or extending the standard model.4 In this study, use of the standard benchmark
model is preferred, and it is compared with the sticky information model to be able to see
the basic differences between these two modeling approaches.
3A cost-push shock represents everything other than the output gap that may affect the marginal cost,
and causes the model to generate inflation variation independent of the demand shock. See Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (1999, 2001, 2002), Ball, Mankiw and Reis (2004).
4See Woodford (2003) for some extensions of the standard model. Also Gali and Gertler (1999) proposed
a ”hybrid” Phillips curve by adding a lagged inflation term to the standard model.
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The results show that impulse responses of the variables to a unit cost-push shock
are hump-shaped and the maximum deviations from steady states occur at some quar-
ters after the shock in the sticky information model as observed in data. However, those
responses for the sticky price model are not hump-shaped and the maximum deviations
occur immediately with the shock contrary to data. These differences in responses are
mainly due to the differences in the structure of expectations in both models. In the
sticky price model expectations are forward looking, that is current expectations of future
economic conditions are important. Thus the maximum impact of the shock on variables
occurs immediately with the shock when new expectations are formed due to the shock.
Then these variables move towards their steady states because expectations include that
monetary authority will response to this shock. However, in the sticky information model,
past expectations of the current economic conditions matter as some firms use old infor-
mation. Therefore, variables further deviate from their steady state after the shock and
the maximum deviations occur at some quarters later because of those past expectations,
which are formed before the shock and so are not affected by the shock. It is also observed
that hump-shaped responses to the shock in the sticky information model depend on the
persistence of the shock. If the shock is not persistent enough then the model produces
less hump-shaped dynamic responses.
The simulations show that both models exhibit enough inflation persistence to a cost-
push shock, however variables are more persistent in the sticky information model. In
both models, the persistence and levels of the responses depend on the persistence of
the shock term, and there is a positive correlation between them. The results also show
that stabilization requires strong interest rate responses to the shock, especially strong
response to the deviation of inflation from its target level, as in the Taylor principle.
Strong inflation and output responses to the shock produce lower standard deviations of
inflation and output, respectively. Also, dynamic responses are more sensitive to deviation
of inflation from its target than to deviation of the output gap in both models. Therefore,
choosing the policy parameter for the response to inflation deviations is the critical part
in designing monetary policy with a Taylor-type rule. It is also observed that sticky
3
information model produces more stabilization in the sense that standard deviations of
the variables are less sensitive to the correlation coefficient of the shock when it is large
and close to one, while sticky price model stabilizes more when the shock is not very
persistent and the correlation coefficient is small and close to zero.
The volatility tradeoff of both models is also compared for different policy alternatives.
Those tradeoffs are similar especially for policy responses to the deviations in the out-
put gap. However, it could be concluded from this analysis that the sticky price model
produces somewhat more stable inflation dynamics, while the sticky information model
produces more stable output dynamics. It is also observed from the results that variables
overshoot their long-run level in the sticky information model if the shock is not persistent
enough, however there are no such overshoots in the sticky price model. Therefore, some
of the initial price increase due to the shock is taken back when inflation overshoots and
becomes negative, and “bygones be bygone” is not always valid in the sticky information
model.
In the next section, the New Keynesian macroeconomic model and the sticky informa-
tion model of price setting are explained. In Section 3 monetary policy framework is given
and explained. In section 4 impulse responses are obtained for both models. Section 5
summarizes the conclusions obtained in this study.
2. Model and Price Settings
The model is a version of the standard New Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium
model with price rigidities, which has been used extensively for theoretical analyses of
monetary policy. In such a model there are several approaches to introduce the cost-push
shock. In this study, households are assumed to be monopolistically competitive suppliers
of their labor to obtain the cost-push shock term.5
The economy is closed and composed of a continuum of identical infinitely lived house-
holds indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] and a continuum of firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Households
5This shock might also arise from the collusion among firms or from variable taxation as in Ball, Mankiw
and Reis (2004).
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supply labor, which is an imperfect substitute of other labors, purchase consumption goods
and hold bonds. Firms hire labor and specialize in the production of a single good that is
an imperfect substitute of other goods. Since each firm and household has some monopoly
power, the economy is the one having the monopolistically competitive markets similar to
those studied in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) or Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).
Each firm sets the price of the good it produces either according to the sticky price or
sticky information assumptions. Households and firms behave optimally and maximize
their utility and profits, respectively. There is also a financial market in the economy in
which households can trade in a range of securities that is large enough to completely
cover all states of nature; that is, complete market is assumed and the households can
insure themselves against idiosyncratic uncertainty.
2.1. Households
Households’ preferences over consumption bundles are assumed identical, and they
derive utility from composite consumption goods and leisure. The utility of household i
in period t is given by
Uit =
C1−σit
1− σ −
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
, (1)
where Cit is a Dixit-Stiglitz type CES aggregator of composite consumption of household
i and is defined over the production Cjit of firm j as
Cit =
(∫ 1
0
(Cjit)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
. (2)
Nit is household i ’s labor supply in period t. Parameter ε is the elasticity of substitution
among the goods and is greater than one. Parameter ϕ is the marginal disutility of labor
and is positive.6 Parameter σ is the risk aversion factor and 1/σ represents the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution in aggregate consumption evaluated at steady state.7
6It can be interpreted as the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
7Intertemporal elasticity of substitution is defined as : 1/σ ≡ −Uc/UccC¯.
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Each household i seeks to maximize the lifetime utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtUit , (3)
where β < 1 is the discount factor. The maximization will be subject to the intertemporal
budget constraint∫ 1
0
CjitPjt dj + Et(Qt,t+1Dt+1) ≤ Dt +
∫ 1
0
WitN
j
it dj , (4)
where Pjt is the price of the goods produced by firm j, Dt+1 denotes the nominal value
of the portfolio of financial assets in period t + 1 that the household holds at the end of
period t. Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for nominal payoffs of assets. No arbitrage
opportunities requires that assets prices should be determined by such discount factors,
and markets are complete so that households can obtain any random payoff Dt+1 at a
price of Et(Qt,t+1Dt+1). Wit is the nominal wage of the labor supplied by household i.
Optimization problem of the household can be divided into two steps. First, household
i allocates its consumption bundle to minimize the total expenditure required to achieve
any desired level of composite consumption index Cit. Then, in the second step, it will
choose optimum consumption level Cit and optimum labor supply Nit given the minimum
cost level from the first step. First step yields
Cjit =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−ε
Cit , (5)
so ε can also be interpreted as the price elasticity of demand for good j. Pt is the aggregate
price index and defined as
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−εjt dj
) 1
1−ε
. (6)
Since households are monopolistically competitive suppliers of their labor, they face
the demand function for their services by firm j as
N jit =
(
Wit
Wt
)−ηt
Nit , (7)
where ηt is the elasticity of labor demand which is the same across households, and Wt is
the aggregate wage index and defined as
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
W 1−ηtit di
) 1
1−ηt
. (8)
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The budget constraint in (4) can be rewritten by using the above results as
PtCit + Et(Qt,t+1Dt+1) = Dt +WtNit . (9)
Then the first order conditions from maximizing (3) subject to the budget constraint (9)
are obtained as
CσitN
ϕ
it =
ε
ε− 1
ηt − 1
ηt
Wt
Pt
, (10)
Wt
Pt
=
µwt
µ
CσitN
ϕ
it , (11)
βItEt
{(
Cit+1
Cit
)−σ ( Pt
Pt+1
)}
= 1 , (12)
where µwt =
ηt
ηt−1 is the optimal wage markup, µ =
ε
ε−1 is the constant price markup, and
Et(Qt,t+1) = I−1t is the price of a riskless one-period asset. Therefore,
cit = Etcit+1 − 1
σ
(it −Etpit+1 + lnβ) (13)
can be obtained, where small characters represent the logarithm of those variables, and
pit = pt − pt−1 is the inflation rate, and it is the nominal interest rate at period t.
Wages are perfectly flexible here, so there is no endogenous variation in the wage
markup resulting from any wage stickiness. However, as in Clarida et al. (2002), shifts
in the ηt result in exogenous variation in the wage markup, and those shifts may be
interpreted as exogenous variation in labor market power of households.
2.2. Firms
Each firm j produces its specialized product with a linear technology according to the
production function
Yjt = AtNjt . (14)
That is, output is only the function of labor input Njt and aggregate productivity distur-
bance At. Capital is just ignored in the production function for simplicity. Labor input
for firm j is given by a CES aggregator of individual household labor N jit as
Njt =
(∫ 1
0
(N jit)
ηt−1
ηt di
) ηt
ηt−1
. (15)
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Firms hire labor, and produce and sell their differentiated products in monopolistically
competitive market. They minimize their cost of production, and their minimization
problem yields
γt =
2µwt − 1
µwt
Wt/Pt
At
, (16)
where γt is the firm’s real marginal cost. Since technology is constant returns to scale and
shocks are the same across the firms, the real marginal cost γt is the same across all firms.
In a monopolistically competitive model, it is assumed that each firm knows that its sale
depends on the price of its product. When all purchases are made for private consumption,
then the aggregate demand Yt corresponds to the households total consumption index. So,
the demand function can be written from equation (5) as∫ 1
0
Cjit di =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−ε ∫ 1
0
Cit di, (17)
Yjt =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−ε
Yt, (18)
and in logs
yjt = yt − ε(pjt − pt) , (19)
where yjt is the output produced by firm j, pjt is the price charged for that product by
firm j, yt is the aggregate output, and pt is the price index for aggregate consumption.
Firms also decide what price P ∗jt to charge to maximize their profit given the demand
function in equation (19). So, the firm j ’s decision problem gives
P ∗jt
Pt
=
ε
ε− 1
Wt/Pt
At
=
µµwt
2µwt − 1
γt . (20)
This is the standard results in a monopolistic competitive market when all firms are able
to adjust their price in every period; that is, each firm set its optimal price P ∗jt equal to a
markup over its nominal marginal cost, Ptγt. By using equation (11), the above expression
can be rewritten as
P ∗jt
Pt
=
ε
ε− 1
µwt
µ
CσitN
ϕ
it
At
= µwt
CσitN
ϕ
it
At
. (21)
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2.3. Equilibrium
Since households are identical and financial markets are complete, households will have the
same initial wealth. As in Woodford (2002), this implies the same consumption decisions
and a common level of consumption denoted by Ct, although the labor supply and output
may change. Therefore, the market clearing conditions require consumption should be
equal to output, so Cit = Ct = Yt.
Since wages are flexible, each household will charge the same wage and provide the
same amount of labor. So, Wit = Wt, and this implies N
j
it = Nit from equation (7).
Therefore, the labor market clearing condition can be written through equation (15) as
Njt = Nit. Then, by using the production function in (14) and the demand function in
(19), equation (21) can be rewritten as
P ∗jt
Pt
= µwt
1
A1+ϕt
[(
P ∗jt
Pt
)−εϕ
σ+ϕ
Yt
]σ+ϕ
, (22)
p∗jt = pt +
σ + ϕ
1 + εϕ
yt − 1 + ϕ1 + εϕ at +
logµwt
1 + εϕ
. (23)
When all firms can set their prices freely in each period, that is when prices are flexible,
all firms set the same price p∗jt = pt. The natural level of output y
N
t is defined as the
level where prices are flexible and the wage markup is fixed at its steady state value µw.
This setup means there are no wage markup shocks, and variations in the natural level of
output do not reflect the variations in the wage markup. Therefore, under flexible price
equilibrium, equation (23) yields
yNt =
1 + ϕ
σ + ϕ
at − logµ
w
σ + ϕ
. (24)
If this is used in (23), one can obtain
p∗jt = pt + α(yt − yNt ) + ut , (25)
where α and the cost-push shock term ut are defined as
α =
σ + ϕ
1 + εϕ
, ut =
log(µwt /µ
w)
1 + εϕ
.
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Therefore, in the framework of this study the cost-push shock term can be interpreted to
represent the bargaining power of households in the labor market.
When equation (13) is aggregated over all households, it can be written in terms of
aggregate output index as
yt = Etyt+1 − 1
σ
(it −Etpit+1 + lnβ) . (26)
With the assumption of an exogenous AR(1) technology shock process at = ρaat−1 + ξt,
this equation can be written in terms of the output gap xt = yt − yNt as
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1) + νt , (27)
where νt = − log βσ −
(1− ρa)(1 + ϕ)
σ + ϕ at . This is the IS equation used in the New
Keynesian framework.
2.4. Price Settings
Price adjustment is the dynamic connection between monetary and real variables. The
specific manner of how prices adjust affects demand and production. Therefore the price
adjustment model is very important for the implication of models for monetary policies.
2.4.1. The Sticky Price Model
The most common type of price adjustment model recently used in literature is the
sticky price model, which is usually based on the Calvo model. In this model firms set
nominal prices on a staggered basis. Each firm adjusts its price with some probability
in each period, independent of the waiting time. Thus, during each period a number of
randomly selected fraction 1−θ of firms change their prices while the remaining fraction θ
of firms keep their prices unchanged. Firms that do not adjust their prices will adjust their
output according to demand function of the market. The standard sticky price Phillips
curve resulting from this model can be obtained in our framework as
pit = κxt + βEtpit+1 + φ(1− βθ)ut , (28)
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where xt is the output gap, φ = (1−θ)/θ, and κ is a constant given by model’s parameters
as κ = φα(1− βθ) .
The sticky price Phillips curve relates current inflation to the current output gap and
expected next-period inflation rate. Therefore, the price setting is forward-looking in this
model. By iterating equation (28), it can be seen that adjusting firms set their prices as a
markup over a weighted average of the expected future output gap because the price they
set will remain unchanged for a random number of periods.8
Although the sticky price Phillips curve has been used as the “workhorse” in literature
and has an appealing theoretical structure, it has been criticized for producing implausible
results regarding inflation and output dynamics. Criticism includes that the sticky price
model does not exhibit the inflation persistence and delayed and gradual effects of shocks
observed in data.9 It is also unable to account for the correlation between inflation and
the output gap. The sticky price model implies that inflation should lead the output
gap over the cycle, although VAR studies have shown that the main effect of a shock on
output precedes the effect on inflation. It also has difficulty in explaining the correlation
between the change in inflation and the output gap.10 This model violates the natural
rate hypothesis and implies that an increasing inflation rate will tend to keep output
permanently low. Ball (1994) showed that credible disinflations cause booms rather than
recession with this model.11 Because of such problems with the sticky price model, there
have been some extensions and alternatives to this model.12
8In our set up the output gap represents the real marginal cost. In general, firms set their optimal
prices as a markup over the expected future real marginal cost.
9Fuhrer and Moore (1995) argue incapability of producing inflation persistence in the sticky price model.
However, if a persistence is allowed in the level of nominal marginal cost, then sticky price model could
produce very persistent inflation. Also, as Taylor (1999) argues inflation persistence could be due to serial
correlation of money growth process. Therefore, as Mankiw and Reis (2002) discusses, the key problem
with the sticky price model is not the persistence of the dynamic responses but the delayed and gradual
responses to shocks.
10Acceleration phenomenon in Mankiw and Reis (2002).
11See, among others, Ball (1994), Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Estrella and Fuhrer (1998), Lown and Rich
(1997), Roberts (1997, 1998) and Gali and Gertler (1999) for empirical difficulties with the sticky price
Phillips curve.
12See Woodford (2003).
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2.4.2. The Sticky Information Model
As an alternative to the sticky price model, Mankiw and Reis (2002) proposed the sticky
information model, which leads to the sticky information Phillips curve. They argue that
dynamics of their model are similar to backward-looking expectations models, and the
expectation structure is close to the Fisher’s contracting model. This model assumes
information of macroeconomic conditions spreads slowly throughout the population. In
this model, prices are set every period, but information collecting and processing, that
is optimal price computing, occur slowly over time. Each period, a randomly selected
fraction 1 − θ of firms receive complete information about the state of the economy and
adjust their prices according to this new information, while the remaining fraction θ of
firms set their prices according to old information. When a firm j sets its price in period
t, it will set it to its optimal expected price according to the last information it has at
period t− k as
pkjt = Et−kp
∗
jt . (29)
A first order approximation of the aggregate price index equation (6) can be given by
pt =
∫ 1
0
pjt dj .
Since the new information arrives at a rate of 1−θ, the share of the firms that last adjusted
their plan k periods ago will be (1− θ)θk. So the price index can be written as
pt = (1− θ)
∞∑
k=0
θkEt−kp∗jt . (30)
By using the p∗jt from equation (25), the price index becomes
pt = (1− θ)
∞∑
k=0
θkEt−k[pt + α(yt − yNt ) + ut] . (31)
Then, the sticky information Phillips curve can be obtained from this equation as
pit =
α(1− θ)
θ
xt +
(1− θ)
θ
ut + (1− θ)
∞∑
k=0
θkEt−1−k(pit + α∆xt +∆ut),
pit = φαxt + φut + (1− θ)
∞∑
k=0
θkEt−1−k(pit + α∆xt +∆ut), (32)
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where φ and α are the same as given above. In the sticky information model, expectations
are the past expectations of current economic conditions. This model also satisfies the
natural rate hypothesis. Because, without any surprises, the model implies that pt =
Et−jpt, and this implies xt = 0.
Mankiw and Reis examined the dynamic properties of the sticky information model.
They used a simple aggregate demand equation and assumed a stochastic AR(1) process
for the money supply, and then obtained the dynamic responses to a monetary policy
shock and compared their model with the sticky price model and a backward-looking
model. Due to their results, the sticky information model can explain a long lag between
monetary policy actions and inflation, while the sticky price model cannot. They also
showed that disinflations are always contractionary, and strong economic activity is
positively correlated with increasing inflation in the sticky information model.
3. Monetary Policy Framework and Solving the Models
3.1. Monetary Policy Framework
In this study, the sticky information model is compared with the sticky price model
in a New Keynesian framework by assuming a Taylor rule for monetary policy and a
cost-push shock to the economy. In the above analysis, the structural equations of price
adjustment and IS are obtained. If a central bank can commit to a simple instrument rule
like a Taylor-type interest rate rule to stabilize inflation and output fluctuations, then
this rule is combined with the structural equations to close the model and to obtain a
framework for the analysis of monetary policy. Therefore, the dynamic responses of the
sticky information model would be obtained from these three equations, which are given
below
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(it −Etpit+1) + νt, (33)
pit = φαxt + φut + (1− θ)
∞∑
k=0
θkEt−1−k(pit + α∆xt +∆ut), (34)
it = δpipit + δxxt + et. (35)
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The policy parameters δpi and δx that are given in the Taylor rule (35) are the interest rate
responses of the central bank to the deviations of inflation and the output gap from their
target levels, respectively. The disturbances in the model are represented by the terms νt,
ut and et.
The framework needed for the analysis of the sticky price model is the same given above
except the price adjustment equation. So this framework is just obtained by replacing
equation (34) with the sticky price Phillips curve given in equation (28).
In order to put those three equations into a matrix system, first, equation (34) is written
for period t + 1, and then the expectations are taken at period t to obtain the following
expression
θEtpit+1 − (αφ+ α(1− θ))Etxt+1 = −α(1− θ)xt + φEtut+1 + (1− θ)Et∆ut+1
+ (1− θ)
∞∑
k=1
θkEt−k(pit+1 + α∆xt+1 +∆ut+1) . (36)
If it is eliminated by using equation (35), the IS equation can be rewritten as
Etpit+1 + σEtxt+1 = δpipit + (σ + δx)xt + et − σνt. (37)
Then the dynamic system from equations (36) and (37) is given by[
θ −α(φ+ (1− θ))
1 σ
] [
Etpit+1
Etxt+1
]
=
[
0 −α(1− θ)
δpi σ + δx
] [
pit
xt
]
+
[
φEtut+1 + (1− θ)Et∆ut+1 + (1− θ)
∑∞
k=1 θ
kEt−k(pit+1 + α∆xt+1 +∆ut+1)
et − σνt
]
,(38)
and it can be written as[
Etpit+1
Etxt+1
]
=M
[
pit
xt
]
+Nt , (39)
where
M =

δpi(αφ+ α(1− θ))
s
(αφ+ α(1− θ))(σ + δx)− σα(1− θ)
s
δpiθ
s
θ(σ + δx)− α(1− θ)
s
 ,
Nt =
[
σ/s (αφ+ α(1− θ))/s
−1/s θ/s
]
14
[
φEtut+1 + (1− θ)Et∆ut+1 + (1− θ)
∑∞
k=1 θ
kEt−k(pit+1 + α∆xt+1 +∆ut+1)
et − σνt
]
,
and s = σθ + αφ+ α(1− θ).
Matrix M is the characteristic matrix of the system given in (39), and matrix Nt is
composed of disturbance terms and predetermined variables, which are know at time t.
This system has a unique and bounded solution for inflation and the output gap if and
only if both eigenvalues of matrix M have modulus greater than one; and if this is the case
the solution can be obtained by solving forward.13
For the sticky price model, the corresponding matrix M satisfies this determinacy
requirement if the interest rate response to the deviations either in inflation or in the
output gap is strong enough (such as satisfying the Taylor principle: δpi > 1). However,
matrix M for the sticky information model given in (39) does not satisfy this determinacy
requirement. It can be easily demonstrated that matrixM for the sticky information model
has two positive roots, with one root is greater than one and the other is less than one.14
Thus, such a dynamic system has an infinite number of bounded rational expectation
solutions as explained in Svensson and Woodford (2003). Therefore, some additional
condition is needed to solve this indeterminacy problem and get a unique solution.
One such condition can be obtained from the framework above. The matrix system
in (39) is obtained by expressing the sticky information Phillips curve given in (34) for
period t + 1, and then taking its period t expectation. However, equation (34) has to
be satisfied by any solution to (39), so this equation can be used to obtain a unique,
bounded rational expectation solution.
3.2. Solution for the Cost-push Shock
The solution technique that will be used to solve the above system is to write all
variables in an infinite MA representation and then find the coefficients in these repre-
13See Svensson and Woodford (2003) for details of indeterminacy problem.
14This is the case if δpi ≥ 1. If δpi < 1, then both eigenvalues of matrix M have modulus less than one,
so there will be no solution for this case.
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sentations when a cost-push shock process is assumed.15 A stationary cost-push shock
process ut = ρut−1 + εt is assumed, where εt is a white noise process with mean zero.
Inflation and the output gap are represented as infinite moving average processes of the
innovation terms εt as
pit =
∞∑
i=0
γiεt−i, xt =
∞∑
i=0
βiεt−i.
The solution requires determining the γi and βi coefficients of these MA processes.
Dynamic responses for a cost-push shock are obtained by solving the version of the
system (39) which only contains the cost-push shock term. Since cost-push shock is
unexpected, the past expectations about the current and future shock terms are zero.16
Therefore, for a unit cost-push shock when other disturbances are assumed to be absent,
the matrix Nt of the system reduces to
Nt =
[
σ/s (αφ+ α(1− θ))/s
−1/s θ/s
] [
[φρ− (1− θ)(1− ρ)]ut + (1− θ)
∑∞
k=1 θ
kEt−k(pit+1 + α∆xt+1)
0
]
(40)
The resultant system can be solved, and one can obtain a bounded, unique rational
expectation solution for inflation and the output gap. The technical details of this
solution are given in appendix.
4. Dynamic Responses for the Cost-push Shock
4.1. The Calibration
To obtain impulse responses and some quantitative results of models, the model’s pa-
rameters need to be calibrated. Three structural parameters of the model are θ, σ and
15In this study, dynamic implications of the sticky information model is analyzed and compared with the
sticky price model by only assuming a cost-push shock to economy. However, as can been seen from the
above framework, there may be two other disturbances to economy, namely demand shock νt and policy
shock et. The analyses of the sticky information model under these shock processes are investigated in
Arslan (2005).
16In the period of t− 1, the economy is in steady state and no shock is expected. However, expectations
change when an unexpected shock occurs at time t, and it is assumed that this unexpected cost-push shock
follows an AR(1) process starting from time t.
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ϕ. The parameter θ measures the degree of nominal rigidity or price stickiness in the
economy, and it is assumed to be 0.75 as in Mankiw and Reis (2002). So, on average,
each firms gets new information or opportunity to set its price in a year, which is in the
accepted range for this duration.17 In the baseline estimation, the other parameter values
are calibrated as: risk aversion factor, σ = 6, which implies a small intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (IES) of 1/σ = 0.167; marginal disutility of labor, ϕ = 0.518, and elasticity
of substitution among goods, ε = 6.
However, there is no consensus on the values of these parameters, especially on the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, so it is possible to see very different values
assigned to them in literature. Many studies in literature estimate the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, but the estimates are widely different across these studies and
are not robust to model specifications and time periods.19 Therefore, robustness of the
results in the baseline calibration need to be checked, and it is performed with different
set of parameter values in the next section.
4.2. The Impulse Responses
Impulse responses of the sticky information and sticky price models to a unit cost-
push shock are given in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. Both figures show the output gap,
inflation, nominal and real interest rate paths for the correlation coefficient of the shock
ρ = 0.8, and for different policy alternatives, which are represented by different values of
17Gali and Gertler (1999) estimated this duration as five to six quarters, while Sbordone (2002) estimated
as nine to 14 months, and survey evidence shows this duration is somewhat less than the above figures and
around three to four quarters. For some survey evidence on the degree of the price stickiness, see Blinder
et al. (1998), Bils and Klenow (2002).
18This value of ϕ is very close to the one obtained in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), which is 0.47.
19For example, among others, Hall (1988) reported estimates of IES ranging from -0.03 to 0.98, while
the estimates obtained by Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1983) lie between 0.5 and 2, and estimates of
Hansen and Singleton (1996) range from 1.73 to 11.61. Also, Beaudry and Wincoop (1996) find that IES
is significantly different from zero and probably close to one in contrast to the result of Hall (1988) and
Campbell and Mankiw (1989) by using US state-level data. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) estimate IES
as 6.25, and admit that this value is much greater than a typical value. They argue that IES represents
the elasticity of expected output growth with respect to the expected real return in their study, a lower σ
(so a higher IES) is possible because of more interest sensitivity of consumption of both consumer durables
and investment goods. On the other hand, RBC literature generally assumes that σ = 1. Such as Cooley
and Prescott (1995), the calibration of Chari et al. (2000) implies that σ = 1 and ϕ = 1.25.
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Fig. 1. Impulse responses of the sticky information model to a unit cost push shock. Policy rules
are described by it = δpipit + δxxt. Cost-push shock is given by the process ut = ρut−1 + εt.
δpi and δx in the Taylor rule.
In both models, a positive cost-push shock increases inflation through the price adjust-
ment equations. The central bank responds to this inflation increase by increasing the
nominal rates. If this response strong enough, the real rate increases; so the economy
contracts and output decreases through the IS equation. Inflation reacts to this output
decrease through expectations and starts to decrease, and this process continues until the
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Fig. 2. Impulse responses of the sticky price model to a unit cost push shock. Policy rules are
described by it = δpipit + δxxt. Cost-push shock is given by the process ut = ρut−1 + εt.
steady state values are reached. If the central bank’s response to the shock is not strong
enough, the real rate might be very small positive or even negative and so the economy
contracts less but the inflation becomes higher as shown in these figures. Such as simu-
lations show that when δpi decreases from 3 to 1, inflation level due to the shock almost
doubles in both models. The last rows of these figures show that dynamic responses of
both models are not very sensitive to the policy parameter δx as much as δpi; such as when
19
δx increases from 0.1 to 0.7, the dynamic responses of the models change little, and output
and inflation increase only by a very small amount.
These figures clearly exhibit that impulse responses of both models have different
shapes. The impulse responses of the variables to a unit cost-push shock are hump-
shaped and the maximum deviations from steady states occur at some quarters after the
shock in the sticky information model as observed in data. However, those responses for
the sticky price model are not hump-shaped and the maximum deviations occur in the
same period with the shock contrary to data.
These differences in responses result from the differences in the structure of expectations
in both models. When a positive cost-push shock occurs and the central bank responds to
it, expectations adjust and public expects inflation to decrease and output to increase after
the shock. In the sticky price model expectations are forward looking, and so only the
future expectations matter. When price setting firms use the lower expectations for future
inflation, the inflation rate starts to decrease immediately after the shock. Therefore,
maximum impacts of the shock on variables occur in the same period with the shock and
they do not further increase and then gradually move towards their steady states. However,
in the sticky information model, past expectations of current economic conditions are
important. Some firms use old information, so the expectations in their price setting do
not include those expectations about decreasing in future inflation. Therefore, variables
further deviate from their steady state after the shock and the maximum deviations occur
at some quarters later because of those past expectations, which are formed before the
shock and so are not affected by the shock.
It can also be seen from Figures 1 and 2 that the variables are more persistent to a
cost-push shock in the sticky information model than in the sticky price model. Since
the sticky price model is sometimes criticized for not having enough inflation persistence
observed in data, this feature of the sticky information model can be considered as an
improvement over the sticky price model.
The standard deviations of the output gap, inflation, nominal and real interest rates
for different policy alternatives and correlation coefficients of the cost-push shock are tab-
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Table 1
Variations of variables to a cost-push shock for different policy rules
Sticky Information Model Sticky Price Model
Policy Rules
for ρ = 0.8 sd(pi) sd(x) sd(i) sd(r) sd(pi) sd(x) sd(i) sd(r)
δx = 0.5, δpi = 3.0 0.279 0.301 0.688 0.409 0.048 0.062 0.113 0.065
δx = 0.5, δpi = 2.0 0.371 0.223 0.631 0.260 0.061 0.043 0.101 0.040
δx = 0.5, δpi = 1.7 0.412 0.189 0.606 0.194 0.067 0.035 0.096 0.029
δx = 0.5, δpi = 1.5 0.445 0.162 0.587 0.142 0.071 0.029 0.092 0.021
δx = 0.5, δpi = 1.3 0.485 0.131 0.566 0.080 0.076 0.022 0.088 0.012
δx = 0.5, δpi = 1.0 0.562 0.071 0.526 0.035 0.085 0.010 0.080 0.005
δx = 0.7, δpi = 2.0 0.383 0.210 0.619 0.236 0.064 0.040 0.099 0.036
δx = 0.3, δpi = 2.0 0.358 0.237 0.644 0.287 0.059 0.047 0.104 0.045
δx = 0.1, δpi = 2.0 0.343 0.254 0.661 0.318 0.056 0.052 0.106 0.051
Notes: Policy rules are described by it = δpipit + δxxt. Cost-push shock is given by the
process ut = ρut−1 + εt.
Table 2
Variations of variables to a cost-push shock with different autoregressive
coefficients for the policy rule: δx = 0.5, δpi = 2
Sticky Information Model Sticky Price Model
ρ sd(pi) sd(x) sd(i) sd(r) sd(pi) sd(x) sd(i) sd(r)
0.9 0.498 0.329 0.832 0.334 0.092 0.092 0.139 0.046
0.7 0.402 0.222 0.693 0.291 0.042 0.024 0.073 0.030
0.5 0.125 0.053 0.223 0.098 0.024 0.010 0.043 0.019
0.3 0.027 0.011 0.049 0.022 0.017 0.006 0.030 0.014
0.1 0.010 0.004 0.018 0.008 0.013 0.004 0.023 0.011
0.0 0.005 0.002 0.009 0.004 0.011 0.003 0.021 0.010
Notes: Policy rule is described by it = δpipit + δxxt. Cost-push shock is
given by the process ut = ρut−1 + εt.
ulated in Table 1 and 2, respectively. In these tables, different policy alternatives are
represented by different values of δpi and δx, and different correlation coefficients are rep-
resented by different values of ρ. Table 1 shows that stabilization requires strong interest
rate responses to the shock. Strong inflation and output responses (large values of δpi
and δx) to the shock result in lower standard deviations of inflation and the output gap,
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respectively. This result confirms the Taylor principle in a sense that stabilization requires
strong responses to the shock. The lower panel in Table 1 shows that dynamic responses
and volatility of the variables are more sensitive to δpi than δx in both models. There-
fore, choosing the policy parameter δpi is more important than choosing δx in designing
monetary policy with a Taylor-type interest rate rule when there is a cost-push shock.
Table 2 gives the standard deviations of the variables for different correlation coefficients
of the cost-push shock. It can be seen from this table for a given δx and δpi that the sticky
information model produces more stabilization in a sense that standard deviations of the
variables are less sensitive to the changes in correlation coefficient of the shock when it
is large and close to one, while the sticky price model stabilizes more when correlation
coefficient is smaller and close to zero.20 Therefore, the sticky information model produces
more stable economy for persistent shocks, while the sticky price model for non-persistent
shocks.
As pointed out in Clarida et al. (1999), there is a short-run tradeoff between output
and inflation in the presence of the cost-push shock, and this tradeoff is obvious in the
dynamic responses shown in Figures 1 and 2. That is, if policy rule to the shock aims
lower inflation then output decreases more, or vice versa. There is also a volatility tradeoff
between inflation and the output gap as can be seen from Table 1. This volatility tradeoff
implications of both models can also be demonstrated and compared by drawing the effi-
cient policy frontier, which shows the standard deviations of the output gap and inflation
under some policy objectives.
Figure 3 shows the efficient policy frontiers for both models when either δpi is fixed and
δx is changed, or vice versa. Those tradeoffs are similar especially for policy responses to
the deviations in the output gap, that is when δx changes and δpi remains fixed. However,
the right panel of the figure implies that the sticky price model produces somewhat more
stable inflation dynamics since it has steeper curve, while the sticky information model
produces more stable output dynamics since it has flatter curve.
20Although the results are not shown here, similar findings were obtained for some other different policy
alternatives.
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Fig. 3. Efficient policy frontiers for the sticky information and sticky price models when there is
a unit cost push shock to the models. When δpi is fixed at 2, δx is changed between 0.05 and 2;
and when δx is fixed at 0.5, δpi is changed between 1 and 4.
The impulse responses to a cost-push shock under a given policy with different cor-
relation coefficient are obtained for both models in Figures 4 and 5. In both models,
persistence and level of the responses depend on the persistence of the shock term. The
persistence and the level of the variables decrease when ρ decreases. The first panels of
Figures 4 and 5 show that when ρ becomes zero, that is shock is just a spike, all variables
return to their steady state values immediately after the shock in the sticky price model
because only future expectations matter in this model; however there are little variations
in the periods after the shock in the sticky information model because some firms still use
old information.
It can also be seen from Figure 4 that the hump-shaped responses to a cost-push
shock in the sticky information model depend on the persistence of the shock. If the
shock is not persistent enough then the model produces less hump-shaped dynamic
responses. Also, for some low level of ρ, variables might overshoot their long-run levels
in the sticky information model; while there are no such overshoots in the sticky price
model. Therefore, some of the initial price increase due to the shock is taken back
when inflation overshoots and becomes negative in the sticky information model. So the
impulse responses to a cost-push shock does not always exhibit a complete ”bygones be
bygones” in the sticky information model.
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Fig. 4. Impulse responses of the sticky information model to a unit cost push shock for different
values of ρ. Cost-push shock is given by the process ut = ρut−1 + εt.
4.3. Sensitivity Analysis
In the above analysis two important structural model parameters are the σ and ϕ. Since
there is no consensus on the values of these parameters, especially on the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution as explained above, the sensitivity of the above results to these
parameters will be investigated in this section.
In my baseline calibration, σ is taken as 6, which implies a small IES of 0.167, and
ϕ as 0.5. Robustness of the results obtained with this baseline calibration to different
parameter set is checked here by assuming σ = 1 and ϕ = 1.25 as in Chari et al. (2000).
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Fig. 5. Impulse responses of the sticky price model to a unit cost push shock for different values
of ρ. Cost-push shock is given by the process ut = ρut−1 + εt.
This calibration of σ implies an IES of 1, which is substantially higher than the IES with
the baseline calibration. Also, in this case, the Phillips curve is more flatter than the curve
in the baseline case, so changes in inflation rate affect output more.
The above analysis is replicated for σ = 1 and ϕ = 1.25, and Figure 6 gives some
sample dynamics for this parameter set in each model. When these responses are
compared with the corresponding ones in Figure 1 and 2, it can be seen that level of the
variables are affected but the dynamic implications do not change much. The responses of
inflation and the output gap to a unit cost-push shock are bigger with this new parameter
set. However, the main conclusions and the basic differences between the sticky price and
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sticky information models obtained with the baseline calibration are still valid here.
5. Conclusions
In this study the sticky information model of price adjustment proposed by Mankiw
and Reis is compared with the sticky price model of price adjustment based on Calvo’s
model in a New Keynesian DSGE framework. Dynamic responses of both models to a unit
cost-push shock are examined and compared for different policy alternatives represented
by a Taylor-type interest rate rule.
The simulation results show that the monetary policy framework with the sticky in-
formation model produces hump-shaped responses, and maximum deviations from steady
states occur at some quarters after the shock as observed in data. However, the responses
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for the sticky price model are not hump-shaped and the maximum deviations occur im-
mediately with the shock contrary to data. It is also observed that the hump-shaped
responses to a shock in the sticky information model depend on the persistence of the
shock. If the shock is not persistent enough then this model produces less hump-shaped
dynamic responses.
The results indicate that variables are more persistent to the cost-push shock in the
sticky information model. The persistence and levels of the responses depend on the
persistence of the shock term in both models. However, when the persistence of the shock
is zero, all variables return to their steady state values immediately after the shock in the
sticky price model, while there are some little variations in the sticky information model.
It is observed that the sticky information model produces more stabilization in a sense
that standard deviations of the variables are less sensitive to correlation coefficient of the
shock when it is large and close to one, while sticky price model stabilizes more when
the shock is not very persistent and the correlation coefficient is small and close to zero.
According to simulation results dynamic responses are more sensitive to interest rate
response to deviation of inflation from its target than the response to deviation of the
output gap in both models. Therefore, choosing the policy parameter of interest rate
response to inflation deviation is more important in designing monetary policy under a
Taylor-type interest rate rule.
When the volatility tradeoffs in both models are compared it is observed that the
sticky price model produces somewhat more stable inflation dynamics, while the sticky
information model produces more stable output dynamics. The results show that
variables may overshoot their long-run level in the sticky information model if the shock
is not persistent enough while there are no such overshoots in the sticky price model.
Therefore, some of the initial price increase due to the shock is taken back when inflation
overshoots and becomes negative in the sticky information model. Also, some sensitivity
analysis is performed and it is observed that the basic results from the baseline calibration
are preserved for different calibration of some model parameters.
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Appendix
A. Solution of the dynamic system for a unit cost-push
shock
The rational expectation solutions for inflation and the output gap are found by first
writing the system in terms of infinite MA representation of variables, and then equating
the coefficients of the ετ terms in order to find the moving average coefficients of the
output gap βτ and inflation γτ . The first equation of the system (39) for a cost-push
shock given the Nt matrix in (40) can be written as
Etpit+1 = apit + bxt +
σ
s
(
k ut + (1− θ)
∞∑
k=1
θkEt−k(pit+1 + α∆xt+1)
)
, (A.1)
where
a =
δpi(αφ+ α(1− θ))
s
, b =
(αφ+ α(1− θ))(σ + δx)− σα(1− θ)
s
, k = φρ−(1−θ)(1−ρ).
It can be written in infinite order MA representation as
∞∑
i=1
γiεt+1−i = a
∞∑
i=0
γiεt−i + b
∞∑
i=0
βiεt−i +
σ
s
[
k
∞∑
i=0
ρiεt−i + θ
∞∑
i=2
γiεt+1−i − θ2
∞∑
i=2
θi−2γiεt+1−i
+ αθ
∞∑
i=1
(βi+1 − βi)εt−i − αθ2
∞∑
i=1
θi−1(βi+1 − βi)εt−i
]
. (A.2)
In the above derivation, the following equalities are used
∞∑
k=1
θkEt−kpit+1 =
θ
1− θ
∞∑
i=2
γiεt+1−i − θ
2
1− θ
∞∑
i=2
θi−2γiεt+1−i , (A.3)
∞∑
k=1
θkEt−k∆xt+1 =
θ
1− θ
∞∑
i=1
(βi+1 − βi)εt−i − θ
2
1− θ
∞∑
i=1
θi−1(βi+1 − βi)εt−i . (A.4)
The equations relating the γτ and βτ parameters of inflation and the output gap can be
obtained by equating the coefficient of ετ terms in (A.2), and they are given by
γ1 = aγ0 + bβ0 +
σkρ
s
, (A.5)
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(
1− θ(1− θ
τ )σ
s
)
γτ+1 − αθ(1− θ
τ )σ
s
)βτ+1 =
aγτ +
(
b− αθ(1− θ
τ )σ
s
)
βτ +
σk
s
ρτ+1 for τ > 0 . (A.6)
The second equation from the system (39) is
Etxt+1 = cpit + dxt − 1
s
(
k ut + (1− θ)
∞∑
k=1
θkEt−k(pit+1 + α∆xt+1)
)
, (A.7)
where
c =
δpiθ
s
, d =
θ(σ + δx) + α(1− θ)
s
.
This can be written in infinite order MA representation as
∞∑
i=1
βiεt+1−i = c
∞∑
i=0
γiεt−i + d
∞∑
i=0
βiεt−i − 1
s
[
k
∞∑
i=0
ρiεt−i + θ
∞∑
i=2
γiεt+1−i − θ2
∞∑
i=2
θi−2γiεt+1−i
+ αθ
∞∑
i=1
(βi+1 − βi)εt−i − αθ2
∞∑
i=1
θi−1(βi+1 − βi)εt−i
]
. (A.8)
Then, the following equations that relate the parameters of the variables can be obtained
β1 = cγ0 + dβ0 − kρ
s
, (A.9)
θ(1− θτ )
s
γτ+1 +
(
1 +
αθ(1− θτ )
s
)
βτ+1 =
cγτ +
(
d+
αθ(1− θτ )
s
)
βτ − k
s
ρτ+1 for τ > 0 . (A.10)
Equations (A.6) and (A.10) can be put into the matrix from as[
1− σζ −ασζ
ζ 1 + αζ
] [
γτ+1
βτ+1
]
=
[
a b− ασζ
c d+ αζ
] [
γτ
βτ
]
+
[
σkρτ+1/s
−kρτ+1/s
]
,
where ζ = θ(1− θτ )/s. After some arrangements, it can be written as[
γτ+1
βτ+1
]
= Zτ
[
γτ
βτ
]
+
[
σk/ηs
−k/ηs
]
ρτ+1 , (A.11)
where η = 1− σζ + αζ, and Zτ is a 2x2 matrix given by
Zτ =
αδpi[φ+ (1− θ) + θ(1− θ
τ )]
ηs
αφσ + αδx[φ+ α(1− θ) + θ(1− θτ )]
ηs
δpiθ
τ+1
ηs
α+ θτ+1(σ + δx − α)
ηs
 .
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Equation (A.11) is a first order deterministic difference equation, and the matrix Zτ
has two positive characteristic roots, such that one is greater than one and the other is
less than one for δpi ≥ 1. Let’s say one root λ1τ > 1 and the other root λ2τ < 1. The
solution to the above system is obtained by finding homogenous and particular solutions.
The homogenous solution is obtained from[
γτ+1
βτ+1
]
= Zτ
[
γτ
βτ
]
for τ > 0 . (A.12)
The matrix Zτ can be decomposed into Zτ = HτΛτH−1τ , where the eigenvectors of Zτ
form the columns of Hτ , and Λτ is a diagonal matrix with λ1τ and λ2τ on the diagonal.
Then, (A.12) can be written as[
γτ+1
βτ+1
]
= HτΛτH−1τ
[
γτ
βτ
]
, and H−1τ
[
γτ+1
βτ+1
]
= ΛτH−1τ
[
γτ
βτ
]
. (A.13)
Let, Wτ = H−1τ
[
γτ
βτ
]
, then (A.13) reduces to Wτ+1 = ΛτWτ , and the following equations
can be written
W1τ+1 = λ1τW1τ , W2τ+1 = λ2τW2τ (A.14)
Therefore, W11 should be zero in order to have a stationary process of W1τ . Therefore,
from the following equation[
W11
W21
]
= H−1τ
[
γ1
β1
]
=
[
h11 h12
h21 h22
] [
γ1
β1
]
, (A.15)
to have a stable system, the initial conditions for homogenous solution should satisfy
h11γ
H
1 + h12β
H
1 = 0 . (A.16)
Wτ can be written for any τ > 1 as[
W1τ
W2τ
]
=
[
h11 h12
h21 h22
] [
γτ
βτ
]
.
Then, from the first equation of (A.14) and the initial condition, the following equation
can be obtained
γHτ+1 = −
h12
h11
βHτ+1 for τ > 0 . (A.17)
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Also, the second equation of (A.14) can be written as
h21γ
H
τ+1 + h22β
H
τ+1 = λ2τ (h21γ
H
τ + h22β
H
τ ) .
If (A.17) is used in this equation, one can get
h21(−h12
h11
)βHτ+1 + h22β
H
τ+1 = λ2τ (h21(−
h12
h11
)βHτ + h22β
H
τ ),
(h21(−h12
h11
) + h22)βHτ+1 = λ2τ (h21(−
h12
h11
) + h22)βHτ ),
βHτ+1 = λ2τβ
H
τ for τ > 0 . (A.18)
The particular solution to the non-homogenous part will be in the form of[
γPτ
βPτ
]
= gτ bτ+1,
where gτ is a 2x1 vector, and b is a scalar. If this is substituted into (A.11) and the
coefficients are equated, the following equations are obtained
gτ b
τ+2 = Zτgbτ+1 +
[
σk/ηs
−k/ηs
]
ρτ+1,
gτ b
τ+1(bI − Zτ ) =
[
σk/ηs
−k/ηs
]
ρτ+1 .
So the parameters of the particular solution can be obtained as
b = ρ ; gτ = (ρI − Zτ )−1
[
σk/ηs
−k/ηs
]
.
Thus, the particular solution for τ > 0 will be[
γPτ
βPτ
]
= (ρI − Zτ )−1
[
σk/ηs
−k/ηs
]
ρτ+1. (A.19)
After having the homogenous and the particular solutions, the complete solution for
the system of (A.11) is given by[
γτ
βτ
]
=
[
γHτ
βHτ
]
+
[
γPτ
βPτ
]
for τ > 0 . (A.20)
For any γH1 or β
H
1 satisfying the initial conditions (A.16), γ1 and β1 can be found by
equation (A.20). Then, γ0 and β0 can be obtained by using equations (A.5) and (A.9).
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Then the remaining parameters of the variables can be obtained from equations (A.17)
and (A.18).
Although this process guarantees non-explosive, bounded solutions for the output gap
and inflation, it does not produce a unique one. Indeed, an infinite number of bounded
solutions can be obtained for the system (A.11), and so for the system (39), given infinite
possible combinations satisfying the initial conditions (A.16). This also because there are
four unknown parameters (γτ , γτ+1, βτ , βτ+1) for τ ≥ 0 and just three equations (A.5,
A.9, A.20) to find them. Therefore, one more additional restriction is needed in order
to obtain a unique solution. This is obtained from the sticky information Phillips curve
given in (34). Since it is valid for every time period, it can be written in terms of general
MA representation, and then the first equation relating the initial coefficients γ0 and β0
is taken. This equation is given by
γ0 = αφβ0 + φ . (A.21)
Writing equations (A.5) and (A.9) in matrix form when γ1 and β1 are divided into ho-
mogenous and particular parts yields[
γH1
βH1
]
=
[
a b
c d
] [
γ0
β0
]
+
[
σkρ/s− γP1
−kρ/s− βP1
]
. (A.22)
The equations (A.16) and (A.21) can be combined with (A.22) in a matrix system as
1 0 −a −b
0 1 −c −d
h11 h12 0 0
0 0 1 −αφ


γH1
βH1
γ0
β0
 =

σkρ/s− γP1
−kρ/s− βP1
0
φ
 . (A.23)
Therefore, the parameter values for τ = 0 and homogeneous solutions for τ = 1 can be
obtained from the above linear system (A.23), and the remaining ones are calculated by
using equations (A.17), (A.18) and (A.19). This gives a unique, bounded, non-explosive
rational expectation solution to the system of equation (39) for a cost-push shock.
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